What Iraqi Air Force?
The LA Times has come out with an article on one of the most under-reported but important considerations for any meaningful discussion of the future of the occupation: the Iraqi Air Force. It sums up the situation thusly: “The U.S. military has hurriedly tried to turn over square mile after square mile of territory to Iraqi soldiers and police officers, but it has yet to yield control of a single cubic inch of the country's skies.” Further, “[A]ddressing the question of when [the US] will allow the Iraqi air force to acquire combat capabilities is years away. The U.S. Air Force… will retain control of Iraqi airspace for the foreseeable future, regardless of any drawdown of ground troops.”
For the sake of thoroughness (and because the risk of long-windedness on this issue is so slight), here is the current status of the Iraqi Air Force, taken from the Department of Defense’s May 2006 report "Iraq: Measuring Stability and Security" (which can be found here):
Iraqi “reconnaissance aircraft consist of single-engine airplanes used in civilian and commercial markets.” In other words, the reconnaissance force is not, strictly speaking, composed of military equipment. It numbers no more than a handful of aircraft. There are three helicopter squadrons: 2nd, 4th & 12th. The 2nd Squadron consists of 16 UH-1H helicopters, all of which will be in the United States for upgrades at least until January of next year. Eight of a planned ten Mi-17 helicopters have been delivered to the 4th Squadron, but are awaiting armor upgrades as well as further pilot training. The 12th Squadron is equipped with five Bell 206 Jet Ranger helicopters, all of which are used for training purposes. The 23rd Transport Squadron has three C-130E planes. This plus 600 personnel (only 14 of whom are actual pilots) represents the length and breadth of the Iraqi Air Force.
There are several points to be made from this. The first regards what effect US control over Iraqi air space will have on Iraqi sovereignty. The second is the stunning lack of clarity about the Iraqi air force as the question of troop withdrawal is batted around the domestic sphere. The third is the longer-term relevance that such control has for the geopolitical interests of the US.
The point about Iraqi sovereignty is the easiest of the three to make. Simply put, there can be no sovereignty so long as a country’s air space is under the complete control of a foreign power. The foreign power acts as a permanent veto on all policies - military and governmental. This particular plank in the overall US strategy is perhaps the most consistent element of the past fifteen years. The 1991 policy of "No-Fly Zones" has been removed from the current lexicon only because the "zone" and the entire country are now indistinguishable.
The second point is murkier, for it involves the misleading rhetoric of withdrawal and the domestic political disconnect with any real commitment to Iraqi sovereignty and self-determination. The problem with calls to “bring home the troops” is not that it is premature or defeatist, but that it is disingenuous. For example, the debate today in the Senate over the Defense Appropriations Bill for 2007 is focused around “redeployment” in Iraq rather than “withdrawal”. (As the New York Times notes, the latter word is not even used in the Democrat's proposal.) Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI), explains “redeployment”: the US would retain a force in Iraq capable of “direct participation in counter-terrorism activities, training Iraqi security forces, and protecting United States infrastructure and personnel.” Beyond police check-point duty, what else is there? The crucial point is that the cited activities can all be accomplished from one of the US’s massive, permanent air bases. The Democratic Party is calling not for withdrawal from Iraq, but for withdrawal to the permanent footprint. This is but the latest in the long line of America's empty gestures toward Iraqi sovereignty.
The geopolitical advantages of a permanent military control over Iraq are too numerous to be handled in detail here. They range from containment of China to bulwark against Iran to support for Israel to encirclement of Russia and beyond. Each of these (and many others) requires separate treatment, not only to emphasize the advantages, but to explore the dangers involved and the ever-present possibility of overstretch. Suffice to say for the moment that wielding ultimate control over Iraq through air power achieves the trifecta of allowing incremental troop withdrawal for US domestic consumption, the absence of major US military presence in Iraqi urban centers and Washington's ultimate authority over the government in Baghdad.
As with any other country, Iraq is incapable of defending itself without an air force. Internally, the central government is incapable of asserting its authority without the air power of the occupier. In short, without an independent air force Iraq as a military power is untenable. Under these circumstances, total US withdrawal would amount to national suicide. If foreign powers (Israel in the Kurdish north or Iran in the Shi’ite south) did not fill the vacuum, then the warring fault lines within the country would rip it apart in short order.
The point to be digested is not that the United States should, therefore, continue to stay in Iraq. Rather it is that the efforts made up to this point (and even on this day) demonstrate clearly that there has never been any intention of leaving. As President Bush recently told the troops in Baghdad, Iraq is the "central front in the war on terror" and, presumably, operates by the laws of that larger conflict on which all parties agree. To truly withdraw from the former, we shall, it seems, have to end the latter.
For the sake of thoroughness (and because the risk of long-windedness on this issue is so slight), here is the current status of the Iraqi Air Force, taken from the Department of Defense’s May 2006 report "Iraq: Measuring Stability and Security" (which can be found here):
Iraqi “reconnaissance aircraft consist of single-engine airplanes used in civilian and commercial markets.” In other words, the reconnaissance force is not, strictly speaking, composed of military equipment. It numbers no more than a handful of aircraft. There are three helicopter squadrons: 2nd, 4th & 12th. The 2nd Squadron consists of 16 UH-1H helicopters, all of which will be in the United States for upgrades at least until January of next year. Eight of a planned ten Mi-17 helicopters have been delivered to the 4th Squadron, but are awaiting armor upgrades as well as further pilot training. The 12th Squadron is equipped with five Bell 206 Jet Ranger helicopters, all of which are used for training purposes. The 23rd Transport Squadron has three C-130E planes. This plus 600 personnel (only 14 of whom are actual pilots) represents the length and breadth of the Iraqi Air Force.
There are several points to be made from this. The first regards what effect US control over Iraqi air space will have on Iraqi sovereignty. The second is the stunning lack of clarity about the Iraqi air force as the question of troop withdrawal is batted around the domestic sphere. The third is the longer-term relevance that such control has for the geopolitical interests of the US.
The point about Iraqi sovereignty is the easiest of the three to make. Simply put, there can be no sovereignty so long as a country’s air space is under the complete control of a foreign power. The foreign power acts as a permanent veto on all policies - military and governmental. This particular plank in the overall US strategy is perhaps the most consistent element of the past fifteen years. The 1991 policy of "No-Fly Zones" has been removed from the current lexicon only because the "zone" and the entire country are now indistinguishable.
The second point is murkier, for it involves the misleading rhetoric of withdrawal and the domestic political disconnect with any real commitment to Iraqi sovereignty and self-determination. The problem with calls to “bring home the troops” is not that it is premature or defeatist, but that it is disingenuous. For example, the debate today in the Senate over the Defense Appropriations Bill for 2007 is focused around “redeployment” in Iraq rather than “withdrawal”. (As the New York Times notes, the latter word is not even used in the Democrat's proposal.) Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI), explains “redeployment”: the US would retain a force in Iraq capable of “direct participation in counter-terrorism activities, training Iraqi security forces, and protecting United States infrastructure and personnel.” Beyond police check-point duty, what else is there? The crucial point is that the cited activities can all be accomplished from one of the US’s massive, permanent air bases. The Democratic Party is calling not for withdrawal from Iraq, but for withdrawal to the permanent footprint. This is but the latest in the long line of America's empty gestures toward Iraqi sovereignty.
The geopolitical advantages of a permanent military control over Iraq are too numerous to be handled in detail here. They range from containment of China to bulwark against Iran to support for Israel to encirclement of Russia and beyond. Each of these (and many others) requires separate treatment, not only to emphasize the advantages, but to explore the dangers involved and the ever-present possibility of overstretch. Suffice to say for the moment that wielding ultimate control over Iraq through air power achieves the trifecta of allowing incremental troop withdrawal for US domestic consumption, the absence of major US military presence in Iraqi urban centers and Washington's ultimate authority over the government in Baghdad.
As with any other country, Iraq is incapable of defending itself without an air force. Internally, the central government is incapable of asserting its authority without the air power of the occupier. In short, without an independent air force Iraq as a military power is untenable. Under these circumstances, total US withdrawal would amount to national suicide. If foreign powers (Israel in the Kurdish north or Iran in the Shi’ite south) did not fill the vacuum, then the warring fault lines within the country would rip it apart in short order.
The point to be digested is not that the United States should, therefore, continue to stay in Iraq. Rather it is that the efforts made up to this point (and even on this day) demonstrate clearly that there has never been any intention of leaving. As President Bush recently told the troops in Baghdad, Iraq is the "central front in the war on terror" and, presumably, operates by the laws of that larger conflict on which all parties agree. To truly withdraw from the former, we shall, it seems, have to end the latter.
1 Comments:
Very interesting article. If the middle east did not have oil for american suv's how long would itt ake to withdraw? who would care if they all killed themselves? cheney had an exit strategy - "Never Exit"
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